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Abstract 
 
We adopt a framework of vertical differentiation to study the issue of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR). We develop a model of duopoly in a two-country 
setting, in which firms choose the country of location, the level of CSR and finally 
compete in the market à la Bertrand. We show that: i) at equilibrium the two 
firms choose different levels of CSR, i.e. an "ethical" and a "neutral" firm coexist 
in the market; ii) regardless of its location choice, the “neutral” firm undertakes a 
level of CSR equal to the minimum international standard; iii) the location choice 
of both the "ethical" and the "neutral" firm depends on the relative costs of CSR 
in the two countries; in addition the choice of the “ethical” firm is influenced by 
the distribution of consumers' tastes for CSR, while the choice of the “neutral” 
firm is affected by the level of the minimum international standard for CSR. 
                                                 
∗ We thank Gianpaolo Rossini for helpful comments. Of course all remaining errors and omissions are entirely 
our own. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. A short review of the literature 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) includes all the "situations where the firm 
goes beyond compliance and engages in actions that appear to further some social good, 
beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law" (McWilliams et al. 
[2006]).1 Hence, the fundamental idea behind CSR is that companies incur responsibilities 
to society beyond maximization of profit and should integrate social and environmental 
considerations in their decision making processes. 
The issue of CSR has gained an increasing importance over the past thirty years and it 
is now widely discussed in newspapers and business school curricula. Furthermore, there is 
widespread evidence that consumers care about CSR when choosing where to shop (see, 
among others, Becchetti and Rosati [2005]). However, until recently only few theoretical 
works attempted to integrate the issue of CSR in the economic literature. The contrast 
between the increasing empirical relevance of CSR and the lack of economic analysis of this 
phenomenon led some authors to argue that the "challenge of the economic literature is to 
incorporate this new feature into its theoretical framework" (Becchetti, Giallonardo and 
Tessitore [2005]). 
One of the first works which studied CSR from an economic perspective is the paper 
by McWilliams and Siegel (2002), which focused on the relationship between market 
structure and CSR and on the implications of CSR as regards the strategic behavior of firms. 
In that paper CSR is seen as a differentiation strategy for the firms in response to the 
sophistication of consumers' demand towards more ethical products. The first conclusion 
of the paper is that CSR should be "neutral" on profits, i.e. at equilibrium socially 
responsible (SR) firms and non-SR firms make identical profits.2 The second is that certain 
firm/industry-specific patterns in the provision of CSR should emerge, depending mainly 
on the characteristics of the products, on the market structure, on the level and the type of 
competition. For example, a high level of CSR is likely to be associated with the following 
elements: a high level of product differentiation in the industry (which normally comes 
from a more sophisticated consumers' demand), a high level of advertising (since CSR 
activities need to be advertised in order to be promoted), experience-goods (i.e. products 
that must be consumed before their value is known, for which advertising is crucial), high 
                                                 
1 There is not one single definition of CSR on which there is consensus in the literature. Another possible 
definition is the following: CSR is a "concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis" (European 
Commission, Green Paper on CSR [2001]). Differently, the working group of the ISO 26000 on Social 
Responsibility defines CSR as "the responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities 
on society and the environment through transparent and ethical behavior that is consistent with sustainable 
development and the welfare of society; takes into account the expectations of stakeholders; is in compliance with 
applicable law and consistent with international norms of behavior; and is integrated throughout the organization". 
2 When CSR is based only on profit motivations and not on ethical considerations, this result has to be verified. In 
fact, if SR firms make higher profits, more firms will start providing CSR, and this process will go on until both 
types of firms have to attain identical profits (the same reasoning works if non-SR firms make higher profits at 
the beginning). 
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consumers' incomes (because the sophistication of costumers' demand is likely to be 
positively related to income), high prices of substitutes goods (in fact, if these are sold at a 
much lower price, the CSR features embedded in the product would not help gain 
significant market shares), large size of firms (because of possible scale economies in the 
provision of CSR) and finally multi-product firms (because of possible scope economies). 
Following this early contribution, there has been a surge of studies which 
concentrated on the role of CSR as a differentiation strategy. These papers developed the 
idea that there is a demand for a more ethical behavior by firms, in some of the markets 
where they compete (e.g. goods, capital, labor), and thus CSR can be used as a strategy to 
attain higher profits.3 In particular, some authors (Bagnoli and Watts [2003], Besley and 
Gathak [2007]) viewed CSR as the private provision by firms of a local public good (e.g. 
social networks, community development)/reduction of a public bad (e.g. pollution); others 
(Becchetti, Giallonardo and Tessitore [2005], Becchetti, Federico and Solferino [2005], 
Manasakis, Mitrokostas and Petrakis [2007], Mitrokostas and Petrakis [2007]) as a 
differentiation strategy in the market of products, in response to consumers' demand for 
goods that embed certain "ethical" characteristics; some again (Brekke and Nyborg [2004]) 
viewed CSR as a labor market screening strategy to attract the most motivated and 
productive employees; others (Baron [2007]) as a strategy to attract "ethical" investors and, 
finally, some (Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett [2000], Baron [2001]) as a strategy used by firms 
to preempt government regulatory intervention in response to the requests of lobby groups 
and the civil society. 
All these contributions try in different ways to provide answers to a few key 
questions on CSR. The first one is whether the firms competing on the same market at 
equilibrium provide different levels of CSR (i.e. there is differentiation at equilibrium) or 
they provide the same level of CSR (i.e. there is no differentiation at equilibrium). The 
second one regards the effects of increased competition in the market on the level of CSR 
undertaken by firms. In fact Baumol (1991) argued that, the more competitive is the market, 
the less room there is for firms to undertake CSR because of the lack of extra-profits to 
spend on these activities. Finally, there is the question of whether CSR is welfare-enhancing 
or not, and what should governments do in order to maximize the increase in social welfare 
via CSR. 
1.2. This paper's approach to CSR modelling 
In the present paper we develop the idea of CSR as a differentiation strategy for the 
firms introducing a two-country setting, which to our knowledge is a novelty in the CSR 
literature. Our main reference is the model of duopoly differentiated by quality developed 
by Motta (1993), which we adapt to the issue of CSR. This framework has already been 
                                                 
3 These works provide an indirect answer to the famous claim by Milton Friedman (1972). Friedman affirmed 
that firms should not undertake CSR because it shifts resources from the firms’ most important objective, which 
is the maximization of shareholders' value (i.e. profit-maximization). However these theories have been able to  
show that in fact CSR, under certain circumstances (e.g. it is aligned with the firms’ business operations or it 
caters certain consumers’ demands), can help the firms increase their profits. For this reason, the theories in 
which CSR is seen as a profit-enhancing strategy are often referred to as the "neo-classical" theories of CSR. 
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applied by Amacher, Koskela and Ollikainen (2004) to a similar problem (i.e. environmental 
quality competition and eco-labeling). 
Before presenting our model, it is useful to quickly recall the main features and 
conclusions of the model developed by Motta (1993). There, the consumers present 
different tastes for quality and are uniformly distributed with unit density. There is no a 
priori upper bound to the level of quality, but there is lower bound to it, which could be 
interpreted as a minimum legal requirement. A further assumption is that the market is not 
covered, i.e. some consumers do not buy the differentiated good at all.4 The model 
comprises a two-stage game in which the firms first decide the level of quality of the 
differentiated good, and then compete on the market, either in prices (i.e. Bertand-Nash 
equilibrium) or in quantities (i.e. Cournot-Nash equilibrium). Four different cases are 
studied, assuming either fixed or variable costs of quality improvement. 
The case which is more interesting for the purposes of our paper is the Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium (i.e. firms choose prices at the last stage of the game) with fixed costs of 
quality improvement (and no variable costs). In this case, Motta (1993) shows that, at 
equilibrium, the two firms choose different quality locations (i.e. there is differentiation at 
equilibrium). This confirms the results of a previous paper by Shaked and Sutton (1982), in 
which firms choose to differentiate their products even when costs of quality are zero, in 
order to relax price competition on the market. However, while in Shaked and Sutton 
(1982), with neither variable nor fixed costs of quality, one firm chooses the maximum 
quality possible and the other a level strictly higher than the minimum (i.e. the maximum 
differentiation equilibrium emerges), in Motta (1993), with fixed costs of quality, both firms 
choose a level of quality internal to the interval of possible qualities. Motta (1993) also 
shows that, should one remove the assumption of uncovered market, it would become 
optimal, for the firm which offers the lower quality, to set its quality to a level equal to the 
minimum requirement. This result corresponds to the one of Tirole (1988). 
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium (i.e. firms choose quantities at the second stage of the 
game) yields less quality differentiation than the Bertrand-Nash one, since in the latter 
firms have a higher incentive to choose more distant quality specifications, due to the 
fiercer competition at the marketing stage of the game. Differently from Bonanno (1986) 
where firms choose not to differentiate when fixed costs of quality improvement do not 
exist, in Motta (1993) there is always quality differentiation at equilibrium, even if not 
maximum. However, Motta (1993) shows that an equilibrium with no differentiation would 
occur if one introduced an upper bound to quality choice and assumed that, when 
computed at this highest level, marginal costs of quality are not as high as the marginal 
revenues. 
A framework of vertical differentiation has already been adopted in the economic 
literature of CSR, assuming that CSR is a feature embedded in the goods which induces the 
consumers to pay a higher price for it. From this perspective, CSR can be assimilated to 
quality. However it is worth noting that there is still some debate in the literature on which 
framework of differentiation (i.e. horizontal vs. vertical) is more appropriate to analyze the 
issue of CSR. Some authors (Becchetti, Giallonardo and Tessitore [2005]) propend for the 
                                                 
4 This assumption has been made because, with full market coverage, the demand function cannot be inverted and 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be analyzed. 
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framework of horizontal differentiation, since empirical studies showed that consumers 
have their own preferred locus on the ethical segment, and do not necessarily prefer to 
have more CSR than less. Others (Mitrokostas and Petrakis [2007] among others) are 
favorable to a framework of vertical differentiation (i.e. more CSR is better for everyone).5 
Our opinion is that, even if it is true that consumers might have different preferred 
locations on the ethical segment with respect to the different aspects of CSR considered 
separately (e.g. environmental protection, labor standards, gender issues, etc.), when CSR is 
considered in an holistic way it seems quite unrealistic to assume that there are consumers 
which, at a given price, prefer to buy the variety of the good with lower CSR content. For 
this reason, in this paper we adopt a  framework of vertical differentiation.6 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
model, analyses the market equilibrium in terms of the provision of CSR and introduces the 
problem of the location choice. Section 3 presents some exercises of comparative statics. 
Finally, section 4 concludes. 
2. The Model 
We consider a duopolistic market with two firms (1 and 2) producing a differentiated 
good. The goods produced by the two firms can differ in their CSR content i.e. the CSR 
activities undertaken by the firms and perceived by its customers. The CSR content of the 
good produced by firm i , with 1, 2i = , is denoted by 
i
s , and we assume, without loss of 
generality, that 
1 2
s s≥  (cf. Tirole [1988] and Motta [1993]). 
Following Tirole (1988) and Motta (1993), we suppose that consumers have the 
same (indirect) utility function, U s pυ= − , if they buy one unit of the differentiated good 
and zero utility if they do not buy it. In this expression, s  and p  are respectively the CSR 
content and the price of the differentiated good. We suppose that consumers differ in their 
tastes with respect to the CSR content of the differentiated good. The term υ  is the 
consumer's taste parameter, which can be interpreted as each consumer's marginal 
willingness to pay for CSR. Parameters υ  are distributed with unit density over the interval 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that Becchetti, in another paper (Becchetti, Federico and Solferino [2005]), implicitly accepts 
that there is at least one element of vertical differentiation in CSR, since in their paper consumers bear a cost only 
in case of a downward deviation from their preferred location in term of "ethical" content of the product, and not 
otherwise. 
6  One possible drawback in applying Motta (1993)’s model to the issue of CSR regards the result of 
differentiation at equilibrium. In fact, while in Motta (1993) at equilibrium the two firms choose different levels 
of quality, the empirical evidence of CSR shows a convergence of firms towards an "ethical" behavior, at least in 
the developed world (cf. the concept of "ethical imitation" in Becchetti, Giallonardo and Tessitore [2005]). 
However it can be shown (cf. Motta [1993]) that, if one introduces an upper bound to quality improvement and 
assumes that, when computed at this level, marginal costs of quality are not as high as marginal revenues, there 
will be no differentiation at equilibrium, with both firms choosing a level of quality equal to the highest possible 
level. The assumption of marginal costs lower than marginal revenues seems quite realistic in the study of CSR. 
In fact, since CSR has been exploited only recently as a differentiation strategy, it is plausible that each marginal 
innovation yields very high returns, much higher than the costs. This leads the majority of firms to undertake a 
similar level of CSR at equilibrium, corresponding to the current "frontier" of CSR. 
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[ ],B Hυ υ , such that 1B Hυ υ= − . Similarly to Motta (1993), we assume that there is no upper 
bound to the possible level of CSR undertaken by firms, but there is a lower bound to it.7 
This can be interpreted as a minimum legal requirement for CSR (e.g. a CSR standard) valid 
all over the world, which we denote as 
0
s .8 Differently from Motta (1993), we assume that 
the market is covered at equilibrium, which means that all consumers buy one unit of the 
differentiated good. This assumption has been made for simplicity of the calculus, and could 
be removed in a follow-up paper. 
We can define 
12
υ  as the taste parameter of the individual which is indifferent 
between buying the good with higher CSR content and buying the other one. For this 
individual we have 
12 1 1 12 2 2
s p s pυ υ− = − , from which we determine: 1 2
12
1 2
p p
s s
υ
−
=
−
. 
Then, we define as 
02
υ  the taste parameter of the individual which is indifferent 
between buying the good with lower CSR content and not buying at all. Hence 
02 2 2
0s pυ − = . 
From this we can find 
02 2 2
p sυ =  and derive the aggregate demand functions for goods 1 
and 2:  
 
1 2
1
1 2
1 2 2
2
1 2 2
H
p p
q
s s
p p p
q
s s s
υ
−
= −
−
−
= −
−
 [1] 
If at equilibrium
 2 2B
p sυ > , then we can affirm that the market is covered because all 
the consumers with [ ]12,Bυ υ υ∈  buy good 2. In order to ensure that positive demands for 
the two goods exist, we must assume that the condition ( ) ( )2 2 1 2 1 2B Hp s p p s sυ υ< < − − <  
holds at equilibrium. With covered market, the demand functions for goods 1 and 2 are: 
 
1 2
1
1 2
1 2
2
1 2
H
B
p p
q
s s
p p
q
s s
υ
υ
−
= −
−
−
= −
−
 [2] 
These functions are easier to use than those with uncovered marked [1] but, as 
previously said, they have the drawback that they can’t be inverted in order to study the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Therefore, only the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium will be studied 
in this paper. 
                                                 
7 Several authors, following McWilliams and Siegel (2002) argue that there is an upper bound to the level of CSR 
which can be undertaken by a firm. This level corresponds to the point when one additional "unit" of CSR does 
not bring any additional benefit to the society because of saturation. However for simplicity we prefer to follow 
the original framework used by Motta (1993). 
8 An example of this minimum global standard for CSR could be UN Global Compact, the world's largest CSR 
framework. The UN Global Compact comprises ten principles drawn from declarations which have been adopted 
by the majority of countries in the world (the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, or the 1992 Rio Declaration on The Environment and 
Sustainability). 
 7
 
The decision process of the two firms can be represented as a three-stage game. At 
the first stage, firms choose their location, in country A ("North") or in country B ("South"). 
At the second stage, firms choose the level of CSR (
i
s ) simultaneously. Finally, at the third 
stage, a competitive process occurs and firms choose prices simultaneously, determining 
indirectly the equilibrium quantities of the two goods. The game is solved by backward 
induction.  
The following assumptions have been made:9 
Assumption 1: 2
H B
υ υ≥ . This ensures that there is a sufficient degree of 
heterogeneity among consumers (cf. Tirole [1988]). Note that, since 1
B H
υ υ= −  (cf. page 5), 
we must have 0 1
B
υ< <   and 1 2
H
υ< < . 
Assumption 2: ( )( )* * *1 2 22 3H B Bs s sυ υ υ− − < . This ensures that the market is covered at 
equilibrium. 
Assumption 3: * *
1 2
s s≥ . Since we have assumed that 
1 2
s s≥  (cf. page 5), this condition 
must also be verified at equilibrium.  
2.1. Marketing stage 
Using backward induction, we first study the last stage of the game, in which firms 
choose prices subject to their previous choices of CSR and location. We assume that there 
are only fixed costs of CSR and no variable costs. In other words, variable costs of 
production do not depend on the level of CSR (
i
s ), whereas fixed costs depend on it.  
The assumption that the costs of CSR are fixed and do not depend on the level of 
production can be justified by the fact that in most cases these are up-front costs for a firm 
and only a smaller amount of them depends on the level of production. Hence, at the last 
stage of the game, the costs of CSR have already been sunk and there are only constant 
marginal costs of production. Without loss of generality, we assume that these costs are 
equal to zero. The study of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium at this stage gives the 
following results. 
 
Proposition 1. At the third stage of the game, firm 1 sets a higher price and produces a 
larger output than firm 2. Hence, at equilibrium there is one firm (i.e. the "ethical" firm) that 
sells to the most ethical consumers, charging a higher price than the other one (i.e. the 
"neutral" firm), which sells to the rest of consumers. 
 
 
                                                 
9 These assumptions regard the possible values of the exogenous parameters in the model. However Assumption 
2 and Assumption 3 have been expressed using the terms *
1
s  and *
2
s , which are the levels of CSR chosen by, 
respectively, firm 1 and firm 2 at equilibrium (cf. sub-section 2.2). These are not exogenous variables per se, but 
are functions of the exogenous variables in the model (see Appendix). However we preferred to express 
Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 in this way for simplicity of notation. 
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Proof. The expressions for the two firms' profits, with marginal costs of production 
equal to zero, are: 
 
1 2
1 1
1 2
1 2
2 2
1 2
H
B
p p
p
s s
p p
p
s s
π υ
π υ
 −
= − 
− 
 −
= − 
− 
 [3] 
Each firms maximize its profit in the price level. In order to determine the First Order 
Conditions (FOCs) for maximization, we compute the derivatives of profits with respect to 
prices and set them equal to zero:  
 
1 2
2 1
1 2
2 1
2
0
2
0
H
B
p p
s s
p p
s s
υ
υ
−
+ =
−
−
− =
−
 [4] 
Solving these expression for the prices, we obtain the reaction functions of the two firms: 
 
( )
( )
2 1 2
1
1 1 2
2
2
2
H
B
p s s
p
p s s
p
υ
υ
− −
=
+ −
=
 [5] 
As expected, these reaction functions show that the prices of the two goods are strategic 
complements, since each price is an increasing function of the other, i.e. an increase of 
2p  
makes it more profitable for firm 1 to increase its price (cf. Varian [1992]). 
After verifying that also the Second Order Conditions are respected, we solve the system of the 
reaction functions of the two firms and we find the level of the two prices at the Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium: 
 
( )( )
( )( )
1 2*
1
1 2*
2
2
3
2
3
H B
H B
s s
p
s s
p
υ υ
υ υ
− −
=
− −
=
 [6] 
Hence, at the last stage of the game, firms set prices at values given above. Since 1
B H
υ υ= −  
and 1 2
H
υ< <  (cf. Assumption 1), it follows that 2 2
H B H B
υ υ υ υ− > − . Hence, * *
1 2
p p>  and both 
prices are positive at equilibrium. 
 
Since quantities are given by the demand functions [2] it is useful to calculate * *
1 2
p p−  at the 
equilibrium: 
 
( )( )1 2* *
1 2
3
H B
s s
p p
υ υ− +
− =  [7] 
Hence, at equilibrium prices, the outputs of goods 1 and 2 are, respectively: 
 *1
2
3
H Bq
υ υ−
=  ; *2
2
3
H Bq
υ υ−
=  [8] 
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Once again, since 1
B H
υ υ= −  and 1 2
H
υ< < , we have 2 2
H B H B
υ υ υ υ− > − , and thus * *
1 2
q q> . 
Assumption 1 ( 2
H B
υ υ≥ ) ensures that the output of firm 2 is positive.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that the outputs of the two firms at the Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium depend only on the distribution of consumers and not on the levels of CSR decided 
at the second stage of the game (see expressions [8]). 
2.2. The choice of CSR levels 
Now we can study the second stage of the game, i.e. the choice of the level of CSR 
embedded in the good sold. Firms maximize their profits subject to their previous choice of 
location. Profits are given by revenues, computed at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, less 
costs and can be written as follows: 
 * * 2
2
i
i i i i i
F
p q S sπ = − −  with 1,2i =  [9] 
We have previously assumed that variable costs of production are null. All costs are 
fixed, and come from two different sources. 
The first component is given by 
i
S , which corresponds to the costs of compliance 
with the labor standards and the environmental regulations, existing in the country where 
the firm is located. Hence, 
i
S  depends only on the choice of the country of location by the 
firm and at this stage of the game 
i
S  is taken as given since the location is chosen in the first 
stage of the game. 
The second component is given by ( ) 22i iF s . These costs depend on the level of CSR 
undertaken by the firm and can be considered as fixed costs with respect to the quantity of 
the good sold by the firm. For these costs we assume a quadratic form, as often made in the 
literature on vertical differentiation (D’Aspremont et al. [1979]). This seems a realistic 
assumption in the context of CSR. In fact, the first "units" of CSR are the least costly because 
a firm can direct its efforts to the easily-achievable targets (the "low-hanging fruits"). 
Afterwards, the costs of additional interventions increase, until the firm comes to a point 
when additional "units" of CSR becomes extremely expensive.10 These costs should be 
interpreted as the costs of making CSR "visible" to the consumers and not only as the costs 
of "doing" CSR. In fact, CSR has to be somehow visible in order for the parameter 
i
s  to enter  
the consumers’ utility function and induce the consumers to pay a higher price for the 
good.11 Hence, we can refer to 
i
s  as the "evident" CSR, and by reflection ( ) 22i iF s  will be the 
costs of making it "visible" to consumers.12  
                                                 
10 For more details see McWilliams and Siegel (2002), Husted and Salazar (2006). 
11 It should be noted that 
is  are “units” of CSR, and not monetary costs for the firm, as it is for iS . 
12 In practical terms, we can identify these cost as the costs of implementation plus the costs of advertising and 
promoting CSR towards the external environment. In the existing literature on CSR this second component of the 
costs (i.e. advertising and promoting CSR) has been set equal to zero since, for large firms in particular, they are 
not very significant (cf. Manasakis, Mitrokostas and Petrakis [2007]). However in our paper we do not set them 
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From the study of the second stage of the game we can conclude the following. 
 
Proposition 2. At the second stage the game, firm 1 undertakes a level of CSR equal to 
( )2*
1
1
2
9
H B
s
F
υ υ−
= , while the other firm sets its level of CSR to the minimum required by 
international standards (i.e. *
2 0
s s= ). Hence, at equilibrium there is differentiation in the levels 
of CSR, with firm 1 (i.e. the “ethical” firm) which sets a level of CSR higher than firm 2 (i.e. the 
“neutral” firm).13 
 
Proof. Using the expressions of the prices and quantities at the Bertrand-Nash 
equilibrium, we can write the profits of the two firms:  
 
( )( )
( )( )
2
1 2 21
1 1 1
2
1 2 22
2 2 2
2
9 2
2
9 2
H B
H B
s s F
s S
s s F
s S
υ υ
π
υ υ
π
− −
= − −
− −
= − −
 [10] 
These need to be maximized with respect to the level of CSR. 
As regards firm 2, we can easily see that 
2
π  decreases monotonically in 
2
s . Hence, firm 2 will 
always set CSR at the minimum level allowed, 
0
*
2s s= .14  
As regards firm 1, the FOC to maximize 
1
π  is 
2
1 1
2
0
3
H B F s
υ υ− 
− = 
 
, from which we can derive 
the optimal level of CSR:  
( )2*
1
1
2
9
H B
s
F
υ υ−
= .  
Assumption 3 ( * *
1 2
s s≥ ) ensures that at equilibrium firm 1 sets a higher level of CRS than firm 2,  
(i.e. the equilibrium with differentiation emerges). 15 There is only one case in which the two 
firms at equilibrium set the same level of CSR, equal to the minimum international standard 
(i.e. the equilibrium with no differentiation emerges).16 
                                                                                                                                          
equal to zero, because one of our objectives is precisely to see what happens when these costs differ from one 
country to another. 
13  Among the values authorized by Assumption 3, there is only one case in which the equilibrium with 
differentiation does not occur, which is when the minimum international standard 
0s (which is fixed exogenously 
in our model) is equal to ( )2 12 9H B Fυ υ− . In this case, since the international standard is set at exactly the same 
level as the level chosen by firm 1, the two firms undertake the same level of CSR.  Hence, the equilibrium with 
no differentiation emerges, i.e. both firms set the level of CSR equal to the minimum international standard 
0s . 
However, we do not take into consideration this case in the remainder of the paper, since it occurs for one and 
only one particular combination of  the exogenous variables. 
14 Of course this result would be different if we did not make the assumption that the market is covered. In fact 
when the market is covered consumers always buy the good and, since there are costs attached to CSR, the 
optimal strategy for the second firm is always to set CSR equal to the minimum level required by law. 
15 It’s worth noting that the degree of differentiation emerging at equilibrium is not the maximum possible, since 
we have assumed quadratic fixed costs of CSR and no upper boundary for CSR. 
16 See Appendix and note 13 (above) for more details. 
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It is interesting to note that the optimal level of CSR for the "ethical" firm decreases 
in the costs of making CSR "visible” to the consumers (
1
F ). We will see in the following sub-
section that these costs depend on the firm’s location choice, which is made in the first 
stage of the game. On the other hand, the optimal level of CSR for the “neutral” firm does not 
depend on its location choice, since it is always set at the minimum level allowed. Hence, 
the lower the costs for the "ethical" firm of making CSR "visible” to the consumers, and the 
lower the minimum international standard, the higher will be, at equilibrium, the degree of 
differentiation between the two firms in the provision of CSR. 
2.3. The Choice of Location 
Let's now turn to the first stage of the game, i.e. the choice of location of the two firms. 
There are two countries in which firms can locate, denoted as A and B. We assume that the 
costs of compliance with local norms and regulations and the costs of making CSR "visible" 
to the consumers depend on the choice of location in one country or the other, such that:
 
i A
S S=  and 
i A
F F=  if the firm i  is located in country A; 
i B
S S=  and 
i B
F F=  if the firm i  is located in country B.
 
By definition, 
i
S depends on the country of location, because it represents the costs of 
compliance with country-specific norms and regulations. In addition, we assume that also 
i
F  depends on the country of location, and in particular that 
i
S  and 
i
F  are mutually 
dependent across countries. In fact, a firm that produces in a country with very low labor 
and environmental standards (low 
i
S ) will probably incur in high costs of making a given 
level of CSR "visible" to its customers (high 
i
F ), as a result of the lack of transparency, 
reliable indicators, infrastructure, accountable Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to partner 
with, etc. In particular, these costs should be higher than those that the same firm would 
face in a country characterized by high labor and environmental standards, where it would 
be relatively easy for a firm to credibly commit on certain CSR activities and also relatively 
cheap to partner with other entities on CSR projects, exploiting the existing social network. 
In concordance with this assumption on the relationship between 
i
S  and 
i
F  across 
countries, in our model we assume that the costs of compliance with local norms and 
regulations are higher in country A than in B (
A B
S S> ), while the costs of making CSR 
"visible" to the consumers are lower in A than in B (
A B
F F< ). Thus, we can refer to country 
A as "North" and to country B as "South". 
One important remark is that in our model we assume that there is no cross-country 
heterogeneity in the distribution of consumers’ tastes for CSR, and no transport costs. This 
could represent a situation in which firms 1 and 2 are constrained to produce in country A 
or B, but sell their products all over the world, and the demand for their products coming 
from the rest of the world is overwhelming with respect to the demand coming from 
countries A and B.17 We made this assumption because the main objective of our paper is to 
                                                 
17 An example of this could be the oil market, in which firms are constrained to produce in certain countries 
where the oil is present, but often sell only a small part of their products in this countries. 
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study how the "costs" of CSR in different countries influence the choice of location of firms, 
in the simplest framework as possible. A further paper could investigate these issues in a 
more sophisticated context, introducing transport costs and heterogeneity in the 
distribution of consumers’ tastes across countries.   
From the study of the third stage of the game we can conclude the following. 
 
Proposition 3. The profits of firm 2 (i.e. the "neutral" firm) are always higher when 
firm 1 (i.e. the "ethical" firm) settles in the country where the costs of making CSR "visible" ( F ) 
are lower (i.e. country "North"). The profits of the "ethical" firm are unaffected from the choice 
of location of the "neutral" firm, since it anticipates that the latter will always undertake a 
level of CSR equal to the minimum international requirement 
0
s .      
 
Proof. If we substitute the optimal levels of CSR (see Proposition 2) in the expressions 
[10], we obtain the expressions of the profits at the second stage equilibrium: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 4
1 0 1
1 1
2 2 2
9 9 162
H B H B H B
s S
F F
υ υ υ υ υ υ
π
 − − −
= − − − 
  
 [11] 
 
( ) ( )2 2 22
2 0 0 2
1
2 2
9 9 2
H B H B F
s s S
F
υ υ υ υ
π
 − −
= − − − 
  
 [12] 
The expressions above prove that the profits of firm 1 (the "ethical" firm) are not affected by 
the choice of location of firm 2 (since they do not depend neither on 
2
F  nor on 
2
S ), while the 
profits of firm 2 (the "neutral" firm) depend on the choice of location of firm 1. In particular, 
from expression [12] we can deduce that, in every case, firm 2 prefers that firms 1 settles in 
country A, where 
1
F  is smaller (since the profits of firm 2 depend negatively on 
1
F ). In fact, a 
lower 
1
F   leads the "ethical" firm to undertake a higher level of CSR and charge a higher price 
for good 1. This, in turn, relaxes the competition at the marketing stage of the game, allowing 
the "neutral" firm to charge a higher price for good 2 too. 
Finally, it is worth noting that both firms’ profits depend negatively on 
0
s . In fact, when the 
minimum international CSR standard increases, there is less room for differentiation for the 
two firms, thus the competition at the marketing stage of the game is fiercer and both firms 
have to reduce the prices at equilibrium (see equation [13], considering that, at equilibrium, 
*
2 0
s s= ). 
 
Proposition 4. The location choice of the "ethical" firm depends on the costs of 
compliance with local norms and regulations ( S ), on the costs of making CSR "visible" ( F ) in 
the two countries, and on the distribution of consumers’ tastes for CSR, but not on the of the 
minimum international standard for CSR (
0
s ). The location choice of the "neutral" firm 
instead depends on the level of S  and F  in the two countries and on the level of the minimum 
international standard for CSR (
0
s ), but not on the distribution of consumers’ tastes for CSR. 
 
Proof. We define 
ij
π , with 1, 2i =  and ,j A B= , as the profits attained by firm i  when it 
settles in country j . These depend on the values of S  and F  in each country. Each firm 
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chooses to settle in the country where it achieves higher profits. Hence, firm 1 chooses to settle 
in country A (country B) when:  
 1 1( )A Bπ π> <  [14] 
And firm 2 chooses to settle in country A (country B) when: 
 2 2( )A Bπ π> <  [15] 
Let's study the choice of firm 2 ( the "neutral" firm) first. As previously said the profits of firm 2 
depend on the choice of location of firm 1 (since they depend on 
1
F , see condition [12]). 
However, when firms interact strategically to choose their location, the choice of firm 2 is not 
affected by the choice of firm 1. In particular, we can derive from conditions [12] and [15] that, 
for any location of firm 1, firm 2 will settle in country A (country B) if: 
 ( )
2
0( )
2
A B B A
s
S S F F− < > −  [16] 
As regards the "ethical" firm, we can derive from conditions [11] and [14] that firm 1 will 
settle in country A (country B) if: 
 
( ) ( )
4
2
( )
162
H B
A B B A
B A
S S F F
F F
υ υ−
− < > −  [17] 
Proposition 4 follows. 
 
The following considerations can be deduced from conditions [16] and [17]. 
Condition [16] implies that the "neutral" firm will settle in the country with stricter 
regulations (i.e. country A, or "North") only if the difference in the costs of compliance with 
local regulations (
A B
S S− ) is more than compensated by the lower costs of undertaking a 
level of CSR equal to the minimum international standard level (
0
s ). On the contrary, if the 
difference in the costs of compliance with local regulations is large "enough", the "neutral" 
firm will settle in country B ("South").  
From condition [16] it is evident that, the lower the minimum international CSR 
standard 
0
s , the more likely firm 2 will settle in country "South", since even a small 
difference in the costs of compliance with local norms will induce the firm to settle there.  
This help us understand the general reluctance of developing countries to set and 
adopt strict international CSR standards. These countries often benefit from large amounts 
of FDIs from developed economies, and one of the reasons of the attractiveness of 
developing countries for FDIs is that they are usually characterized by looser norms and 
regulations in the areas of labor and the environment then developed ones. With respect to 
this, condition [16] tells us that an increase in the international CSR standards would 
reduce the incentives of all the "neutral" firms to locate their production in the countries 
characterized by looser norms.  
As regards the location choice of the "ethical" firm, condition [17] implies that firm 1 
will settle in country B ("South") if the difference in the costs of implementing local norms 
(
A B
S S− ) is large enough to counteract the higher costs of making CSR "visible" to the 
consumers than in country A. This condition is significantly different from condition [16]: 
0
s  does not enter inequality [17], implying that the minimum international CSR standard 
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does not affect the choice of location of the "ethical" firm18 and there is a term, 
( )42
162
H B
B A
F F
υ υ−
, 
which depends from consumers' preferences for CSR. Since we assumed that consumers are 
distributed uniformly with unity density, υ
B
 is equal to 1
H
υ −  (see page 5) so ( )42 H Bυ υ−  
can be written as ( )41Hυ + , which depends only on Hυ .  
Hence, the higher 
H
υ , the larger must be the difference in local regulations (
A B
S S− ) 
in order to induce the "ethical" firm to settle in the country with looser local regulations (i.e. 
country "South"). 
The parameter 
H
υ  has different interpretations. First of all, it can be interpreted as 
the average consumers’ "preference" for CSR: the higher 
H
υ , the more "ethical" are the 
consumers on average.19 Secondly, this parameter also captures the heterogeneity in the 
"ethical preferences" of the consumers. This can be shown easily. The ratio 
1
H H
B H
υ υ
υ υ
=
−
 
measures the heterogeneity in consumers' preferences for CSR. Since 0 1
B
υ< <  and 
1 2
H
υ< <   (cf. Assumption 1), the ratio ( )1H Hυ υ −  is a monotonically decreasing function 
of 
H
υ .20 Hence, the higher 
H
υ , the more homogenous are consumers’ preferences for CSR. 
A final consideration that can be made, is that conditions [16] and [17] suggest at 
least one possible way for developing countries to attract FDIs (i.e. to attract both the 
"neutral" and the "ethical" firms in our model). This would be to reduce 
B
F
 
(i.e. the costs of 
making CSR "visible" to consumers), in order to cut the difference between 
B
F  and 
A
F . For 
this purpose, developing countries should introduce the necessary reforms to facilitate the 
practice of CSR and increase its visibility. Examples of these interventions are the 
promotion of Public and Private Partnerships (PPPs), of a social network prone to CSR 
interventions, and of systems allowing to increase the reliability of CSOs, such as the Civil 
Society Information System (CSIS) recently introduced in some developed countries (e.g. 
USA and Germany).21 
                                                 
18 This result can be somehow compared to the case of an innocuous minimum standard (see Garella [2007]). In 
the CSR literature, the case of a standard which is lower than the level of CSR already undertaken by firms, has 
been incidentally analyzed by Besley and Gathak (2007) and Brekke and Nyborg (2004). 
19 Since 
Hυ  and Bυ  are linked one to the other by a deterministic relationship, when Hυ  increases, Bυ  has to 
increase.  
20 In fact, 
1 1
1 11
1
H
HH
H H
υ
υυ
υ υ
= =
−− −
. 
21 Looking at conditions [16] and [17], there is of course another strategy to attract FDIs, which is to reduce 
further local norms and regulation in the areas of labor and the environment (
B
S ). Leaving aside all possible 
ethical considerations on the opportunity of doing so, it should be noted that, in any case, all the firms located in 
whatever country have to comply with the minimum international CSR standard. Hence, this constitutes a sort of 
lower bound for the countries in the process of reducing 
B
S , thus limiting their possibilities of relaxing labor and 
environmental legislation as a way to attract more FDIs. 
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3. Comparative Statics 
Let's turn now to some considerations of comparative statics.  
We start from an initial situation where both firms are located in country A ("North"), 
and then analyze the effects of possible variations of the minimum international CSR 
standard (
0
s ) and of consumers' preferences for CSR (
H
υ ). 
The fact that both firms are located in country A implies that the exogenous variables 
respect the following conditions: 
 ( )
2
0
2
A B B A
s
S S F F− < −  [18] 
 
( ) ( )
4
1
162
H
A B B A
B A
S S F F
F F
υ +
− < −  [19] 
Conditions [18] and [19] ensures that, respectively, firm 2 (the "neutral" firm) and 
firm 1 (the "ethical" firm) settle in country A ("North"). In fact, when the exogenous 
variables 
A
S , 
B
S , 
A
F , 
B
F  and 
0
s respect condition [18], firm 2 attains a higher profit by 
settling in country A than in country B. On the other hand, when the exogenous variables 
A
S , 
B
S , 
A
F , 
B
F  and 
H
υ respect condition [19], firm 1 attains a higher profit by settling in 
country A than in country B. 
We analyse first the effects of an exogenous variation of 
0
s . A variation of 
0
s  does not 
affect the relative attractiveness of the two countries for firm 1 (see condition [19]), hence 
it does not influence the location choice of the "ethical" firm. Otherwise, it affects the 
relative attractiveness of the two countries for firm 2 in the following way (see condition 
[18]): an increase of 
0
s  makes country "North" even more attractive for the "neutral" firm, 
while a decrease of it increases the relative attractiveness of country B with respect to A 
and, if this decrease is large enough to invert the sign of inequality [18], it will induce the 
"neutral" firm to relocate in country "South". 
Hence, the overall effect of an increase of the international minimum CSR standard 
0
s
 
on the location of firms is the status quo (i.e. both firms stay in country A). On the other 
hand, a significant reduction of 
0
s  could lead the "neutral" firm to relocate in country 
"South". In fact, as a result of the reduction of the minimum international CSR requirement, 
firm 2 undertakes less CSR at equilibrium, and thus the costs attached to CSR become less 
relevant relatively to the costs of compliance with local labor and environmental 
regulations, in determining the location choice.    
Then, we analyse the effects of an exogenous variation of 
H
υ . We need to recall that 
an increase (decrease) of 
H
υ  indicates an increase (decrease) of the average consumers’ 
"preference" for CSR, and also a reduction (augmentation) of the heterogeneity of these 
preferences (see page 14). In more practical terms, an increase of 
H
υ  depicts the evolution 
from an initial situation in which only a few consumers care about the "ethical" behavior of 
firms and these consumers are concentrated in a few areas of the world, while the majority 
does not care or is simply unaware of the issue, towards one in which more people are 
aware of CSR and care about it when choosing where to shop. A reduction of 
H
υ  instead 
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could result from the increased buying power of consumers from developing countries, 
which are usually less concerned about ethical issues when choosing where to shop. This 
reduces the average "preference" for CSR globally and increases the heterogeneity of 
consumers’ preferences. 
In our model, a variation of 
H
υ  does not affect the relative attractiveness of the two 
countries for firm 2 (see condition [18]), hence it does not influence the location choice of 
the "neutral" firm. Otherwise, a variation of  
H
υ  affects the relative attractiveness of the two 
countries for firm 1 in the following way (see condition [19]): an increase of 
H
υ  makes 
country "North" even more attractive for the "ethical" firm, while a reduction of it increases 
the relative attractiveness of country B with respect to A and, if this decrease is large 
enough to invert the sign of inequality [19], it will induce the "ethical" firm to relocate in 
country "South". 
Hence, the overall effect of an increase of 
H
υ  (i.e. the average consumers’ preference 
for CSR increases and the distribution of these preferences is less heterogeneous) is the 
status quo (i.e. both firms stay in country "North"). On the other hand, a significant decrease 
of 
H
υ  could lead the "ethical" firm to relocate in the country with the loosest labor and 
environmental norms (i.e. country "South). In fact, as a result of the lower consumers’ 
preference for CSR and the increased heterogeneity of their preferences, firm 1 reduces its 
level of CSR at equilibrium, and thus costs of compliance with local regulations become 
more relevant relatively to the costs attached to CSR, in determining the location choice. 
Interestingly, the "neutral" firm stays in country "North", despite the stricter regulations in 
that country with respect to "South". 
We could repeat this exercise starting with different initial situations.  
For example one interesting case is when the "ethical" firm is initially located in 
country "North" while the "neutral" firm is in country "South".22 In our model, this implies 
that the exogenous variables respect the following conditions: 
 ( )
2
0
2
A B B A
s
S S F F− > −  [20] 
 
( ) ( )
4
1
162
H
A B B A
B A
S S F F
F F
υ +
− < −  [21] 
Conditions [20] and [21] determine that, respectively, firm 2 (the "neutral" firm) 
settles in country B ("South") and firm 1 (the "ethical" firm) settles in country A ("North").  
                                                 
22 This is a situation which we often observe in reality, and could be determined by some elements which we did 
not take into consideration in our model: the possible heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences for CSR across 
countries and the existence of transport costs (see page 11 for a discussion of this issue). In fact, if the average 
consumers’ preferences for CSR are different across countries and there are transport costs, the two firms might 
find it more profitable to serve prevalently the local market, undertaking a level of CSR which reflects the 
average preferences of their local customers. For example, companies in developing countries, where consumers 
are usually less concerned about CSR, could decide to undertake a lower level of CSR than their counterparts 
located in  developed countries, where the sophistication of consumer’s demand is higher. This is what typically 
happens to the small and medium enterprises in developing countries, which, unless they are part of the supply-
chain of large multinational companies, produce goods that are sold locally and thus are not affected by the 
preferences of global consumers and consumers in other areas of the world. 
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Starting from this initial situation, the overall effect of a reduction of the international 
minimum CSR standard 
0
s
 
on the location of firms is the status quo (i.e. the "ethical "firm 
stays in country "North" and the "neutral" in "South"). Otherwise, an increase of 
0
s , if it is 
large enough to invert to invert the sign of inequality [20], leads the "neutral" firm to 
relocate in country "North". In fact, as a result of the tightening of the international CSR 
standard, the costs of undertaking this new level of CSR required increase more in the 
country where CSR is more expensive (i.e. country "South") than in the other one (i.e. 
country "North"), hence the relative attractiveness of country "North" for the "neutral" firm 
increases. 
Finally, the effects of a variation of 
H
υ  are similar to the ones analyzed in the 
previous situation. In fact we have seen that a variation of 
H
υ  affects only the relative 
attractiveness of the two countries for the "ethical" firm, which is located in the same 
country as in the previous case (i.e. country "North").  
4. Conclusions 
We developed a model of CSR as a differentiation strategy for the firms, adapting 
Motta (1993)’s model of vertical differentiation to the issue of CSR.  
In the market there are two firms and a group of global consumers, exhibiting a 
preference for CSR which is uniformly distributed with unit density. We introduced 
quadratic costs of CSR, which can be interpreted as the costs of undertaking CSR and 
making it "visible" to the consumers. Other costs for the firms are the costs of compliance 
with country-specific labor and environmental regulations. All these costs are fixed with 
respect to the level of the outputs. Finally, there is an exogenous minimum international 
CSR standard, which is applied worldwide regardless of the country of location of the firms.  
In this context, we showed that, when the market is covered and firms compete à la 
Bertrand, the two firms choose different levels of CSR at equilibrium. One firm (the "ethical" 
one) undertakes a positive level of CSR, which depends negatively on the costs of CSR, 
targeting the more ethical consumers; the other (the "neutral" firm) undertakes a level of 
CSR equal to the minimum international requirement. The "ethical" firm sells at a higher 
price than the "neutral" one, and produces a larger output. 
Then, we introduced the possibility for the firms of choosing between two countries 
of location. One country ("North") has stricter labor and environmental regulations than the 
other ("South"), which translate in higher fixed costs of production for the firms. However 
in country "North" the costs of undertaking CSR and making it "visible" to consumers are 
lower than in country "South". We showed that the profits of the "neutral" firm are always 
higher when the "ethical" firm settles in country "North". Nonetheless, the choice of 
location of  the "neutral" firm does not depend on the location of the "ethical" firm. 
Finally, starting from different initial locations of the two firms, we analyzed the 
effects of a change of the minimum international CSR standard and of consumers' 
preferences for CSR. We showed that a change of the international CSR standard could 
affect the location choice of the "neutral" firm, while a variation of consumers' preferences 
for CSR (i.e. a variation of the average “preference” for CSR of the global consumers and of 
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the heterogeneity of these preferences) might have an impact on the location choice of the 
"ethical" firm. In particular, a significant increase (decrease) of the international CSR 
standard can determine the relocation of the "neutral" firm from country "South" to country 
"North" (from country "North" to country "South"), and an increase (decrease) of the 
average preference for CSR can determine the relocation of the "ethical" firm from country 
"South" to country "North" (from country "North" to country "South"). 
In conclusion we would like to point out some of the limits of our approach. In our 
paper we did not address the issue of the CSR "neutrality" on profits (cf. McWilliams and 
Siegel [2002]), since we could not solve the equation of the firms’ profits for a unique range 
of the parameters. In addition, as previously mentioned, in our model we assumed that 
there is a generic arena of global consumers, without taking into consideration transport 
costs and possible cross-country heterogeneities in the distribution of consumer’s tastes for 
CSR. It would be interesting to analyze the effect of introducing different hypotheses, such 
as for example different average preferences for CSR in the two countries and positive 
transport costs, inducing firms to sell most of their production locally. We consider this 
paper as the starting point for future research in this direction, with the additional objective 
of studying the trade patterns between the two countries. 
Appendix.  Parameters’ values allowed in the model. 
The following conditions can be derived, respectively, from Assumptions 2 and 3 (see 
page 7), when we substitute the equilibrium values of *
1
s  and *
2
s  determined at the second 
stage of the game (see Proposition 2):   
 
( ) ( )
( )
2
0
1
2 2
9
H B H B
H B
s
F
υ υ υ υ
υ υ
− −
>
+
 [22] 
 
( )2
0
1
2
9
H B
s
F
υ υ−
≤  [23] 
From conditions [22] and [23], one can deduce that the minimum CSR standard (
0
s ) 
must be within the following range of values, expressed in terms of the other exogenous 
variables in the model: 
  
( ) ( )
( )
( )2 2
0
1 1
2 2 2
9 9
H B H B H B
H B
s
F F
υ υ υ υ υ υ
υ υ
− − −
< ≤
+
 [24] 
It should be noted, however, that 
1
F  is not exogenous per se, but at equilibrium it 
depends on the location choice of firm 1. In particular, it is higher (lower) when firm 1 
settles in country B (A), since we have assumed that 
A B
F F< (cf. page 11). In the paper we 
have seen that, depending on the values of the exogenous variables, at equilibrium firm 1 
could settle either in country A or in country B. Hence, condition [24] must hold in both 
cases (i.e. for 
1 A
F F=  and 
1 B
F F= ). 
Finally, one should note that a necessary condition for this inequality to hold is the 
following: 2
H B H B
υ υ υ υ− ≤ + . Since 1
H B
υ υ= + , that is equivalent to: 1
H
υ ≥ .  
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